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Tom Casier
Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, Brussels, Belgium
ABSTRACT
To understand the gradual worsening of EU–Russia relations in the
decade preceding the Ukraine crisis, it is essential to understand
the dynamics of their interaction. This article divides EU–Russia
relations into three stages on the basis of changing intergroup
dynamics: asymmetrical cooperation (1992–2003), pragmatic but
increasing competition (2004–2013) and conﬂict (2013–present).
It draws on the concept of ‘attributional bias’ to explain the
escalating logic of competition during the second stage. The EU
and Russia started to attribute each other negative geopolitical
intentions up to the point where these images became so
dominant that they interpreted each other’s behaviour almost
exclusively in terms of these images, rather than on the basis of
their actual behaviour. With the Ukraine crisis, EU–Russia relations
changed from competition over institutional arrangements in the





When the EU and Russia entered into a Strategic Partnership and agreed on
cooperation in four Common Spaces in 2003, they did so with fairly good intentions
and strong ambitions on both sides. A good decade later, EU–Russia relations are in
the deepest crisis since the end of the Cold War. This did not happen abruptly. The
Ukraine conﬂict is the ‘culmination of a long-term crisis of EU–Russia relations’ (Hauk-
kala, 2015, p. 25). Most analysts have explained the ‘gradual deterioration’ (Sakwa,
2014, p. 31) of relations as the result of exogenous factors: shifts in international
power relations, elite changes, security concerns, disagreement about the post-Cold
War order, domestic power concentration, etc. All of these explanations have contrib-
uted signiﬁcantly to our understanding of the conﬂict. But there is more to it. To under-
stand how we evolved from cooperation to competition and ultimately to conﬂict, we
additionally need to understand the endogenous dynamics of EU–Russia interaction. In
other words, to understand how relations derailed, we also need to understand how
the interaction evolved, how mutual negative images developed, how distrust came
to dominate the relationship. The word also is important in this sentence. The analysis
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this article seeks to offer is not so much a rivalling explanation, but a complementary
one.
To do so, this article goes to the heart of the diametrically opposed perceptions of
events on both sides. Grasping the dynamics behind the evolution of EU–Russia relations
may help us to understand better how we ended up with such widely diverging percep-
tions and narratives of the current crisis on either side. In this sense, this article goes
against the idea that the conﬂict can be reduced to structurally incompatible interests
(Mearsheimer, 2014) or clashing norms (see my critique, Casier, 2013). Even if the
current tensions could be reduced to these deeper structural issues, it still needs to be
explained why they occurred when they did. Why was there a great deal of optimism in
2003, when the Common Spaces were agreed, and in 2005, when the Roadmaps were
designed – a time when Russia had already grown considerably stronger, NATO had
gone through its second eastern enlargement and Putin had been president for six
years? Why have deep mistrust and hostile feelings come to replace this relatively positive
attitude?
The argument of this article is that EU–Russia relations have been transformed in and
through their interaction. A logic of competition has developed, which has grown stronger
and eventually escalated over Ukraine, implying a shift from competition to a fundamen-
tally new stage of conﬂict. Borrowing from insights in social psychology, the way the EU
and Russia understand each other’s behaviour is approached in this article as driven by
the images they have formed of the intentions of their counterpart, rather than by the
latter’s actual behaviour. Understanding the process dynamics helps to understand how
images radicalised, how geopolitical readings started to dominate foreign policy, how
relations were understood increasingly in terms of a zero-sum game and so on. Again,
this is not to discard structural causes of the crisis in East–West relations. Rather it is to
highlight that these structural factors do not simply ‘present’ themselves to the actors,
but come to them through the complex images they hold of each other and of the
context in which they operate.
The article will ﬁrst present the theoretical approach, which draws on intergroup
dynamics and the notion of ‘attributional bias’. It will then use those concepts to
explain how EU–Russia relations have evolved from cooperative, over competitive to
conﬂictual.
Theoretical approach
Intergroup dynamics and attributional bias
To capture the dynamics of EU–Russia interaction, this article relies on theories from social
psychology. They help to explain the evolution from fairly cooperative relations, over com-
petitive but pragmatic relations to the recent conﬂict over Ukraine. The emphasis is on
intergroup dynamics, the attribution of negative intentions to outgroups and the con-
ditions under which respectively competition and conﬂict emerge. My approach rests
on two pillars: Kowert’s concept of ‘attributional bias’ and Gries’s four-stage model explain-
ing the conditions of intergroup competition and conﬂict.
The theoretical approach is closely connected to Social Constructivism, but goes
one step beyond it. Constructivists have strongly focused on identities as ‘images of
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individuality and distinctiveness (“selfhood”) held and projected by an actor and formed
(and modiﬁed over time) through relations with signiﬁcant “others”. Thus the term
(by convention) references mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other’
(Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996, p. 59). It is through a process of social interaction
that identities are produced and reproduced, slowly changing over time. Though structure
and agency are seen as inseparable, Constructivism tends to focus strongly on the inter-
subjective nature and shared understanding that underpin structure, less on agency
(Kowert, 1998). This is where social psychology offers additional value. First, it offers
more suitable tools for understanding the role of agents within a process of social inter-
action. Second, it is better equipped to explain change within this interaction. While
Wendt expects that embedded identities are ‘resistant to change’ (Wendt, 1992, p. 418),
the concepts of social psychology employed here will exactly help us to understand
how the images the EU and Russia held of each other changed, in this case rather rapidly.
Social psychology states that ‘the ordinary function of human cognition cleaves the
social world into “self” and “other” categories of agency’ (Kowert, 1998, p. 106). Simple div-
isions between the groups are enough to create categories of ingroup and outgroup,
which are linked to diverging identities. As ‘political categories become more salient’
(Kowert, 1998, p. 110), the parties will exaggerate the identities of the both ingroup and
outgroup. Kowert (1998, pp. 108–109) states that there is a tendency ‘to exaggerate differ-
ences between political groups and to underestimate differences within these groups’. In
other words, the coherence of the ingroup is overrated, as well as the differences with the
outgroup. Moreover, there is a tendency
to attribute the behaviour of political outgroups to the intent or desire of those groups;
ingroup behaviour, however, will more often be attributed to the inﬂuence of environmental
constraints. Perceived increases in the power of outgroups will strengthen the tendency to
assume intent (attributional bias). (Kowert, 1998, p. 109)
At the heart of the ‘attributional bias’ is thus the notion that an ingroup, as it perceives
growing differences with an outgroup, tends to understand the behaviour of the outgroup
predominantly in terms of its perceived negative intentions, while it sees its own behav-
iour as reasonable, given the constraints in which it is forced to operate. The bias occurs
because the interpretation of the actions of the outgroup is not based on the latter’s actual
behaviour, but on the basis of the image that has been formed that its behaviour is driven
by bad intentions. This theoretically underpins the core argument of the article: the esca-
lating logic of competition was driven by a process in which the EU and Russia started to
attribute each other negative geopolitical intentions up to the point where these images
became so dominant that they interpreted each other’s behaviour almost exclusively in
terms of these images. In other words, their policies were determined by the image of
what the other had become, rather than what it was actually doing. This is the essence
of the endogenous dynamics which this article seeks to capture.
A second element I borrow from social psychology theories on in and outgroups is how
intergroup relations move from pure social comparison to competition and to conﬂict.
Gries presents a four-stage model to capture the link between in group positivity and hos-
tility vis-à-vis outgroups (2005). The evolution from positive identiﬁcation with the ingroup
to conﬂict with outgroups is not inevitable. It is a process that is dependent on the
conditions and driven by certain agents. The model of Gries should thus be read as a
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(3) Intergroup competition and
(4) Intergroup conﬂict.
Ingroup positivity ‘does not inexorably lead to intergroup competition, let alone con-
ﬂict’ (Gries, 2005, p. 239). The transition to competition (from stage 2 to 3) will only
occur if groups (in our case Russia and the EU) engage into ‘salient’, ‘consequential’ and
‘zero-sum’ social comparisons (Gries, 2005, p. 240). This may be the case, according to
Gries (2005, p. 257), ‘when the goodness or honor of our nations is challenged’. The
notion of attributional bias comes in as the distortion in the social comparison with the
outgroup, where the latter is ascribed negative intentions and its behaviour is interpreted
in this context. Agents play an active and determining role, engaging in zero-sum social
comparisons and promoting biased images of intergroup relations.1
It is important to note here that for Gries all three conditions – salient, consequential
and zero-sum comparison with the outgroup – need to be fulﬁlled in order to move to
intergroup competition. This is all but inevitable. Groups may opt for alternative strategies,
such as social mobility or social creativity (Gries, 2005, p. 240). In the case of social compe-
tition, the ingroup seeks to displace the outgroup with higher status. In the case of social
mobility, on the other hand, it seeks to imitate the outgroup rather than compete with it. In
the case of social creativity, it seeks to gain status in new areas (Larson & Shevchenko,
2014). The choice of strategy will depend on agents and circumstances.
Finally, Gries explains the transition from intergroup competition to conﬂict (from stage
3 to 4) on the basis of anger over an injustice that needs to be rectiﬁed or the reassertion of
status (2005, p. 257). Agents here may be active mobilisers of feelings of injustice or
humiliation.
The question may be raised to what extent these theories from social psychology can
be applied to states or state-like entities. Of course it should be recognised that the EU and
Russia are not homogenous ingroups. There may be diverging views within the elites and
between them and the public opinion. There are different interest groups within the elites,
with their own agendas. The EU itself consists of 28 member states with their own policies
and of different institutions with their own logics. Yet, those theories presented have been
applied to states.2 Moreover, several authors have analysed EU and Russian discourses as
containing a sufﬁcient degree of coherence (see, e.g. Averre, 2009; Browning & Christou,
2010; Clunan, 2009; DeBardeleben, 2012; Klinke, 2012; Morozov, 2015; Simão, 2011). Nar-
ratives of policy-making elites are seen in these studies as having enough unity to be con-
sidered as a representative discourse. The coherence appears even more strongly if we
approach the intergroup relations through the lenses of foreign policy-makers and their
formal statements, as will be done here.
Self-evidently we have to recognise this model cannot fully grasp the complexity of
the process of EU–Russia interactions at all levels and in all dimensions. But ultimately,
the same argument holds for interest-based explanations. None of them can grasp the
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complexity of interest formation in all member states, in all domestic spheres, in all insti-
tutions either.
Dynamics
The term ‘dynamics’ is used here to refer to a continuous process of action and reaction,
whereby a certain logic of action develops. In other words, the action of actor A is based on
what it perceives the behaviour of actor B to be. In turn, actor B will decide on its action on
the basis of the image it has created of A’s behaviour. The dynamics become to a degree
autonomous as they develop predominantly on the basis of the images, not of actual
behaviour. The images created tend to be conﬁrmed by what is seen as ‘actual’ behaviour,
while it is actually an image of behaviour. As a result the (re)action gets further detached
from ‘reality’ and gets fuelled by its own images. For example, it will be demonstrated in
our case how Moscow and Brussels started to interpret each other’s regional integration
initiatives exclusively as attempts to maximise inﬂuence, rather than a form of political
and economic cooperation. The concept of ‘attributional bias’ thus helps to explain
why rival integration projects – as such not per se problematic – were seen as mutually
threatening. The ‘integration dilemma’ of Charap and Troitskiy (2013) demonstrates the
same development against a different theoretical background. In analogy with the secur-
ity dilemma, the exclusivity of well-intended integration initiatives (the Eastern Partner-
ship (EaP) and Eurasian Customs Union (ECU)) is interpreted by the other side as a
threat to its security and thus gets seen as a zero-sum game (Charap & Troitskiy, 2013,
p. 50). This risks to result in an ‘escalatory spiral’ (Charap & Troitskiy, 2013, p. 60). States
start
making worst-case assumptions about the motives of other states. Such assumptions can lead
to recurrent rounds of escalation – a costly spiral of action and reaction in the context of little
or no communication between the rival parties. Under the conditions of the integration
dilemma, the leaders of rival blocs both escalate their attempts to induce or compel a
country to join their respective groupings and increasingly lash out at one another, diminish-
ing trust between them. The negative impact of this rivalry increases as competition continues
to spiral. (Charap & Troitskiy, 2013, p. 51)
The driver of the dynamics of action and reaction is that – as competition spirals – the
action of the other can easily be interpreted as a conﬁrmation of the negative (biased)
image held. This perceived conﬁrmation solidiﬁes the negative image and enhances its
credibility. Luke March, for example, notes: ‘Western policies have certainly created an
environment where the Russian elite can readily portray the nation as isolated, victimised
and threatened, even if the Kremlin exploits this environment opportunistically’ (2012,
p. 421). As they seem to be conﬁrmed by actual behaviour, these views radicalise and
zero-sum geopolitical frames become dominant.
The rest of the article studies the process of EU–Russia relations over three stages,
arguing that intergroup dynamics generated an evolution from cooperation to compe-
tition and ultimately to conﬂict. A ﬁrst stage is one of asymmetrical cooperation and
roughly coincides with the 1990s. The second stage is one of formally symmetrical
relations, based on pragmatic, but increasing competition. The contours of this stage
are clearly dominant between 2004 and late 2013. To study the gradual deterioration of
EU–Russia relations, I will systematically analyse EU and Russian images of Self and
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Other, substantiating the process dynamics and attributional bias through quotes of
leading policy-makers. Finally, there is the current stage of confrontation over Ukraine,
starting in late 2013. The latter two stages coincide with what Gries labels intergroup com-
petition and intergroup conﬂict and will be the main focus of the analysis.
Stage 1: the dynamics of the master and the pupil (1992–2003)
EU–Russia relations in the 1990s were clearly characterised by asymmetrical relations. The
EU was the dominant agenda setter and relations strongly reﬂected its preferences. The
EU’s policy vis-à-vis the former communist countries in general was aimed at exporting
its rules and norms, seeking to foster reforms and redesign institutional structures in
East-European countries. Institutionally, this stage is built around the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). It was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1997. It
came at a moment, where both the EU and Russia appeared on the international scene
in a novel form. The Treaty of Maastricht had established the EU as a new organisation,
with a foreign policy agenda and the ambition to play a more important international
role in a new post-Cold War context. Russia had appeared as the post-communist succes-
sor of the USSR. It adopted a liberal-democratic constitution and sought recognition in the
(Western dominated) international community of states. The early 1990s have been
referred to as the ‘honeymoon’ between Russia and the West (Pushkov, 1993). It was a
time when Russia was willing to collaborate with the West. While the emphasis in the
early years was on an America ﬁrst policy, this slowly shifted towards a Europe ﬁrst
policy. This change was reﬂected in the ‘Medium-term strategy’ of the Russian government
in 1999, declaring the EU its most important partner (Medium-Term Strategy, 1999).
The dynamics of this era could be described as follows. Relations were based on a
strong will to cooperate, but they were very asymmetrical. The agenda was predominantly
EU-centric. Vis-à-vis all former communist countries Brussels took on a role as helper (pro-
viding assistance in such diverse ﬁelds as economic reconversion, democratisation and
disarmament) and guide (promoting democratic and neo-liberal norms and transferring
its rules and legal principles). The relations with Russia had strong master–pupil features,
even if Russia was not always seen as the most complacent pupil in the class (see also
Neumann, 1998).
The asymmetry of relations is understandable against the background of the political
instability, deep economic recession and chaos in the 1990s, with the ﬁnancial crisis of
1998 as an absolute low point, conﬁrming Russia’s relative weakness. Russia was a
country struggling with internal reforms. It aspired to reoccupy a prominent place on
the international scene and hoped to return to a position of greatness. At the same
time, Russia realised all too well that the main obstacles for this were of an internal
nature. This is illustrated well by the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation
of 2000 (Kontseptsiya, 2000). Most of the challenges mentioned were of an internal nature.
Russia’s self-image was thus one of a country that had to solve its internal problems
ﬁrst. In terms of intergroup dynamics, a gap was perceived between the ingroup and out-
group, but this gap was primarily seen as the result of domestic problems. The responsi-
bility to close the gap was with the ingroup (Russia) helped by the outgroup (the EU). One
could argue that the positive self-identiﬁcation in Russia was fairly low throughout the
1990s. As a result, Russia was willing to accept guidance by the EU and asymmetrical
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relations. Generally no negative intentions were attributed to the EU. In the Medium-Term
Strategy, it is described as an important and evident partner. To solve internal problems,
domestic economic recovery and a predictable, cooperative international environment
were essential. Concerns over NATO and its enlargement, however, would increase
towards the end of the 1990s (Light, Löwenhardt, & White, 2000).
In this context of highly asymmetrical relations, Russia’s power strategy could be
described as one of ‘social mobility’ (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014). Russia’s ambition was
to reform itself along the (neo-)liberal norms of its Western counterparts and thus to be
recognised as a ‘normal’ power (Tsygankov, 2005) and acceptable partner. It would thus
climb on the status ladder in international relations. In short, it was a non-confrontational
strategy where the levels of competition remained low.
The EU, from its side, identiﬁed itself with the role as guide or teacher. The Maastricht
Treaty had reinforced the organisation and substantially enhanced its international ambi-
tions. It had more autonomy for designing its own foreign and security policy, now that the
Cold War was over and US protection was no longer required. At the same time, it was
confronted with the challenge of developing policies towards Eastern Europe, now that
the continent was no longer divided by an Iron Curtain. The EU adopted a self-image of
guide/teacher promoting and supporting structural reforms in former communist
countries. Their foreign policy towards their eastern neighbours was a clear instance of
‘structural diplomacy’ (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). The EU was promoting structural
reforms in the longer term, by transferring rules, norms and institutional practices. Relying
on the policy instrument of conditionality, the EU aimed at profoundly reshaping domestic
political and economic structures in post-communist countries, modelled on those of the
EU and its member states.
Towards the former satellite states of the Soviet Union and the Baltic states, it developed a
strategy of enlargement, based on strong conditionality. It was a strategy based on the exten-
sion of its model of integration. Towards the (other) former Soviet states, the policy was one
of ‘exporting’ rules and norms, as well as steering the domestic transformation. It was fairly
monolithic in its approach towards the Newly Independent States (NIS). This policy had
similar objectives and rested on similar ﬁnancial (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth
of Independent States (TACIS))3 and legal instruments (PCAs) for all target countries.
However, while the policy towards former Soviet states had also strong structural features,
it was based on weaker conditionality, as the ‘big’ reward of accession was lacking.
Stage 2: towards a logic of competition (2004–2013)
Pragmatic but increasing competition
The cooperative relations of the 1990s came under increasing strain towards the end of
the decade. Undoubtedly there are multiple reasons for this. Many centred around the
increasing disappointment about the lack of recognition of post-communist Russia as
an acceptable power and neglect for Russia’s concerns (Sakwa, 2014). Bringing in the
elements of contingency, a couple of cumulative events in 1999 created a turning
point. Together these events would produce a national consensus among Russian elites
that the West was unwilling to grant Russia a place in the international community of
states, but was instead exploiting Russia’s weakness by acting against its interests (Light
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et al., 2000). These events were: the Kosovo military intervention (without UNmandate and
without consulting Russia), the ﬁrst Eastern enlargement of NATO (when former satellite
states of the USSR acceded to the alliance) and NATO’s Washington Strategic Concept
(which made it possible to operate outside NATO territory). This was later further
reinforced by the colour revolutions, most importantly the Orange Revolution of 2004
in Ukraine (De Haas, 2010, p. 157), which Russian elites perceived as masterminded by
the West. The change equally resulted from domestic power changes. As new Russian pre-
sident, Putin initially managed to recentralise power – at the expense of oligarchs and
regional leaders. Stepwise power got more concentrated under his rule. His foreign
policy became more assertive, as showcased in his speech at the Munich conference in
2007. Rising energy prices and the resulting economic growth gave Russia a stronger
material basis for this more vocal foreign policy (Macfarlane, 2006).
This second stage is characterised by Russia’s rejection of EU normative hegemony,
which is increasingly labelled as interference into domestic affairs. Russia displays a reluc-
tance to play the game according to the rules the EU is imposing in its view. Russia’s ambi-
tion is to be recognised as equal partner of the EU, instead of following in its slipstream. As
a result the partnership lost its EU-centric focus and became a continuous balancing exer-
cise between the preferences of the EU and Russia, with sometimes mixed outcomes, but
often no signiﬁcant results. Eventually, the dynamics of relations changed from master–
pupil relations to competition, with the behaviour of the other often interpreted as stra-
tegic moves to gain power and inﬂuence.
Despite the psychological effect of the events of 1999, the transition to a new stage
would not be abrupt. It roughly took until 2004 before the contours of the new stage
became really clear.4 The new stage of EU–Russia relations was characterised by images
of competition, which would evolve from the margin to the centre of the agenda and
set into motion a logic of competition. The transition became visible when the Feira Euro-
pean Council of 2000 opted for a more pragmatic policy vis-à-vis Russia (Haukkala, 2010,
pp. 122–125; Timmins, 2002, p. 88). The EU started to abandon its structural and normative
policy and chose a strategy of ‘constructive engagement’, based on a policy ‘of engaging
Russia in mutually beneﬁcial cooperation based on common interests, while continuing to
criticize Russia for the lack of common values’ (Haukkala, 2010, p. 123). The emphasis
rapidly shifted towards the former.
Russia’s decision not to join the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) constituted the
clearest break with the ﬁrst stage of (relative) cooperation. Russia, a country ﬁve times the
size of the EU, did not want to be regarded as just one of the EU’s neighbours. Seeking
symbolic recognition as a major power, equal to the EU, it rejected EU steered reforms
as interference. Instead Brussels and Moscow engaged into a so-called Strategic Partner-
ship. The term had started popping up already in 1999.5 It was sealed when Russia and the
EU agreed in St. Petersburg in 2003 on Four Common Spaces of cooperation (economic;
freedom, security and justice; external security; research, education and culture). Brussels
and Moscow symbolically recognised each other’s signiﬁcance, stating they were ‘part of
each other’s neighbourhood’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2004, p. 6).
Russia thus got recognition as ‘key partner of the EU’ (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 2004, p. 4), rather than just a neighbour.
While the Strategic Partnership was agreed in an atmosphere of cooperation and
engagement, it would soon turn into a continuous balancing exercise between the two
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giants, where symbolism mattered greatly. Competition took the overhand and it became
increasingly difﬁcult to make any real progress. For example, it was decided in 2008 at the
Khanty-Mansiysk summit to launch negotiations on a New Agreement, to replace the out-
dated PCA. Little progress was made. Partnership for Modernisation, agreed in 2010 under
President Medvedev, was an attempt at relaunching EU–Russia relations but never took
really off. Instead tensions increased over energy, market access, visa regulations, regional
cooperation, etc. Competition, however, was constrained by a pragmatic approach:
despite the difﬁculties to make real progress, there was a continuous willingness to talk.
Tensions particularly escalated over the EU’s new EaP policy, launched in 2009, and the
Russian initiative to create an ECU with Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010.6 The EaP was a
new dimension of the ENP, with a stronger bilateral focus, a foreign policy dimension
and more explicit on interests. It envisaged a new generation of Association Agreements,
including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Three of those have been
signed in 2014 with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The ECU, launched one year after the
EaP, signalled a change of Russia’s course. While Moscow for a long time chose to develop
integration among former Soviet states in the framework of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States, it now opted to develop deeper forms of integration with ‘coalitions of the
willing’. The co-existence of both ‘rivalling’ regional projects forced the countries in
between to make a choice, as both forms of cooperation were legally incompatible.
From the very beginning Brussels and Moscow saw each other’s initiatives very negatively
and as geopolitical manoeuvres. How this happened will be investigated in the following
sections. First, I look at the images the EU and Russia held of themselves and each other,
noticing the gap constantly grew wider. Second, I reﬂect on the dynamics behind this
widening gap. Self-evidently this evolution should be seen against the background of
deeper, competing visions for post-Cold War Europe between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic
community. The Euro-Atlantic project of ‘wider Europe’was a Brussels-centric vision, based
on the extension of the EU and NATO. The Russian project of ‘greater Europe’ envisaged
fundamentally new multipolar structures, built around centres of gravity in Moscow, Brus-
sels and Ankara (Sakwa, 2014, p. 27).
In terms of Gries’s model, EU–Russia relations evolved during this stage towards inter-
group competition. For Gries, the transition from ingroup positivity to intergroup compe-
tition is determined by social comparison, that is, comparison with the outgroup. The
conditions for the transition is that this comparison is salient, consequential and zero-
sum (Gries, 2005, p. 240).
EU images
The EU’s interpretation of relations with Russia was strongly based on a ‘postmodern-
modern binary’, which reﬂects assumptions of higher developments and backwardness.
As Klinke (2012, p. 929) puts it,
whereas Russia is seen as caught up in a modern spatial framework of ﬁxed territory, national
identity and traditional geopolitics, the European Union embodies a postmodern spatial
mindset that simultaneously reﬂects and drives the dissolution of sovereign territory, the for-
mation of multi-layered identities and the disappearance of geopolitics.
Klinke (2012, p. 936) detects this binary not only within EU institutions but argues that it
extends to experts and journalists as well. He illustrates how the modern-postmodern
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binary, essentially an analytical and academic concept, became part of the rhetoric of EU
policy-makers as well.
The identity of what Manners would later on call a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002),
also became part of the self-image of the EU (see also Klinke, 2012). The asymmetrical
relations which ‘normative power’ presupposes (Diez, 2013) were not questioned. The ﬂip-
side of the coin is the unquestioned character of the norms, the EU was promoting. This
resulted in what Haukkala (2008, 2010) has described as ‘normative hegemony’. The norms
and rules promoted by the EU were seen as evident, to be followed by it post-communist
neighbours. This solidiﬁed asymmetrical relations. It placed the EU in the position of
‘natural’ leader, with all the comparative advantages this would generate.
When it comes to ‘its geopolitics, the EU is in denial’ (Klinke, 2012, p. 936). The sharp
delineation between the perceived norm driven foreign policy of the EU and the perceived
Realpolitik of Russia seems to lead EU policy-makers to believe that its policies have neither
a geopolitical motivation nor geopolitical consequences (Casier, 2013). The EU perceived
Russia as an important, but unwilling partner. Its own behaviour was seen as reasonable.
As a result, it underestimated the negative impact of its ENP and later the EaP. The latter
was presented as nothing but an open choice and not an anti-Russian move (see different
testimonies of European External Action Service (EEAS) ofﬁcials in the inquiry by the House
of Lords, 2015). However, it was clear that signing Association Agreements was not a
power neutral operation. It inevitably affected trade ﬂows, political relations and ultimately
Russia’s capacity to exert inﬂuence in the former Soviet space – where Russia claimed it
had key interests.
Russian images
Russia’s self-image was very different. Feklyunina (2008, p. 612) concludes that the images
used most frequently under Putin’s presidency are of Russia as a great power, an energy
superpower, and as ‘non-imperial’ in the post-Soviet space. Reinforcing the great power
image, Russia presented itself as ‘an independent centre of power in a multi-polar
world’ (Feklyunina, 2008, p. 614). In 2005, Putin referred to Russia’s ‘civilising mission on
the Eurasian continent’ (Putin quoted in Feklyunina, 2008, p. 619), while President Medve-
dev spoke in 2008 of Russia’s ‘privileged interests’ in the post-Soviet space (Medvedev,
quoted in Reynolds, 2008). In summary, during this stage Russia tried to promote an
image of ‘a country without imperial ambitions but with legitimate interests in the neigh-
bouring states’ (Feklyunina, 2008, p. 620), a distinction which was hard to get across.
Relations with the West in general turned increasingly negative. What dominated was a
‘sense of disappointment and disillusionment, even betrayal by “the West”’ (House of
Lords, 2015, p. 20). Sergei Karaganov accused the West of failing ‘to give up the “velvet-
gloved Versailles” policy towards Russia, i.e. to abandon its policy of systemic encroach-
ment on spheres of Russia’s vital interests’ (Karaganov quoted in Sakwa, 2014, p. 212).
While the USA and NATO are the ﬁrst to be blamed, this also affects relations with the
EU, which developed to a degree in the shadow of NATO–Russia relations. Moreover
Russia looked very negatively at the EU’s policy towards the countries ‘in between’. Hauk-
kala notes that the ENP and EaP, as well as EU rule transfer, were seen in Moscow as
nothing but a geopolitical strategy (2008, p. 43). Foreign Minister Lavrov called the EaP,
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at the time of its launch in 2009, an attempt by the EU to build ‘a sphere of inﬂuence’
(quoted in EU Observer, 2009).
Understanding the dynamics
A logic of competition developed in EU–Russia relations during this stage. Behaviour of the
Other was readily seen as an attempt to obstruct the power and inﬂuence of the Self. We
can speak of a ‘logic’ of competition because of its autonomous dynamics: the negative
attribution of competitive behaviour became abstracted and detached from reality and
had the capacity of self-reinforcement.
How negative images of each other’s intentions became mutually reinforcing is clearly
visible from the interaction over the two integration projects EaP and ECU. As such, these
are predominantly forms of economic integration. Seldom are these forms of regional
cooperation seen as a problem. On the contrary, the EU has traditionally been a supporter
of regional integration initiatives elsewhere in the world, such as Mercosur or ASEAN. In
this case, however, Moscow and Brussels regarded each other’s integration projects as riv-
alling. The ECU was seen as reﬂecting Russia’s bigger regional power ambitions, posing a
potential threat.
Russia, in turn, emphasised that its actions were driven by economic, rather than geo-
political reasons. As noted, the interpretation on the EU’s side was fundamentally different.
A recurring image of Russia was based on the quote by Putin, which – largely taken out of
context – became strongly determining for the perception of his foreign policy motiv-
ations. In his 2005 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, Putin called the collapse of
the Soviet Union ‘a major geopolitical disaster of the century’ (2005). While the speech
only refers to the drama for the Russian nation and citizens and does not mention any
need to reinstate the old Soviet Union, the quote has been regularly used as an indication
of Russia’s neo-imperialist geopolitical agenda. Attempts to counter this perception were
not very successful. Putin stated, for example, that ‘Russia was one of the main initiators of
the break-up of the Soviet Union.… And to say or to hint that Russia wishes to regain the
greatness of a superpower is simply nonsense’ (Putin quoted in Feklyunina, 2008, p. 619).
In 2005, Ferrero-Waldner, then External Relations Commissioner, referred to ‘Russia’s
drift to a bloc mentality’ and a ‘zero-sum attitude to cooperation with the European
Union in the New Neighbourhood countries’ (2005). The negative intentions perceived
in Russian foreign policy pushed the EU in the direction of a different policy towards its
Eastern neighbours. The EaP added a security dimension to the ENP. Under Polish
impulse and fostered by the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008, the policy
obtained an ‘anti-Russian’ dimension, which was not present in the original ENP (Sakwa,
2014, pp. 39–40).
When Putin presented his plans for a Eurasian Union in an interview in Izvestiya (Putin,
2011), this was broadly understood as a geopolitical project. The establishment of the ECU
was largely coined in the EU and the West in general as a regional geopolitical project
aimed at reinstating control. Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, for example,
stated in 2012 that labels like ‘customs union’ could not conceal Russia’s regional power
ambitions (Clinton quoted in Wolczuk & Dragneva, 2013, p. 4). Yet the founding docu-
ments of the ECU as such give little reason to understand the project geopolitically.
They display striking resemblances with the EU institutions and procedures and do not
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really deviate from similar initiatives elsewhere in the world. Moreover, the ECU was an old
idea of Kazakh President Nazarbayev dating back to the 1990s, so it could hardly be seen
as purely inspired by Russian geopolitical thinking.
Yet, Russian actions and reactions helped to reinforce these geopolitical images. In an
inquiry by the House of Lords, Denis Volkov of the Levada Centre points out that ‘succes-
sive Russian governments had exploited “the situation if not of conﬂict then of controversy
between Russia and the West” and that it had been part of ofﬁcial policy to “exploit the
idea of Russia as some sort of besieged castle”’ (Volkov quoted in House of Lords, 2015,
p. 21). In Russia, we witnessed a further concentration of power, a worsening reputation
in the ﬁeld of human rights and more coercive actions vis-à-vis neighbours. The latter
fuelled images of Russia as neo-imperialist, seeking control over post-Soviet countries.
This made it easier to read their actions as malicious.
Along similar lines, it can be illustrated how EU actions in the neighbourhood were
understood in Moscow as a conﬁrmation that they were geopolitically motivated. The
evolution towards a more anti-Russian and security-based approach of the EU to its
eastern neighbours was seen as a result of its 2004 enlargement. Sergei Yastrzhembsky,
for example, claimed their accession ‘brought the spirit of primitive Russophobia’ to the
EU (Yastrzhembsky quoted in Sakwa, 2014, p. 21). The theme of Russophobia slowly
gained a visible position in the Russian discourse.
The EU’s unwillingness to enter into a formal dialogue with the ECU was seen as a con-
ﬁrmation of its geopolitical ambition to build a sphere of inﬂuence at the expense of
Russia. For example, at the EU–Russia summit of June 2012, the EU refused to start
direct negotiations with the ECU, as Russia had demanded. While there may have been
other practical concerns on the EU’s side (such as entering into negotiations with President
Lukashenka, at a time when sanctions against Belarus were in place), this was read by
Moscow as a refusal to recognise Russia’s regional leadership role. This, in turn, reinforced
Moscow’s negative image of the EU refusing to recognise Russia as equal partner and great
power.
The consolidation of these Russian images of the EU’s intentions was helped by an
inherent tension in Brussels policies towards Eastern Europe that had developed after
its ENP programme and its Russia policy got decoupled (Wolczuk, 2009). The ENP/EaP con-
tinued to be characterised by structural diplomacy, based on conditionality and aiming at
long-term structural reforms along the EU ‘model’ and privileged relations. The Association
Agreements aimed at associating neighbouring countries economically, approximating
their regulation to that of the EU and aligning their foreign policies with Brussels. The stra-
tegic diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia, on the other hand, was built on the premise that Russia
was an equal partner and a frank recognition of its interests was at the heart of the Stra-
tegic Partnership (Allen & Smith, 2012). It is clear that the two policies were incompatible:
the EU could not create such a far-reaching association with exactly those countries, where
Russia claimed to have ‘privileged interests’. This inevitably undermined the EU’s credi-
bility as a genuine, well-meaning partner of Russia. It fed the negative images in
Moscow about its intentions.
Mutual suspicion reached an unknown height as a result of increasing tensions over
Ukraine in 2013. Kyiv had to make a choice between joining the ECU or signing an Associ-
ation Agreement with the EU. This choice was understood on both sides as ultimately a
geopolitical choice. Furthermore, Moscow and Russia accused each other of coercing
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Ukraine to choose their camp. Lavrov, for example, stated that ‘Brussels told Ukraine to
choose between the West and Russia’ and ‘Kiev was forced into signing arrangements
with the European Union’ (Lavrov quoted in Haukkala, 2015, p. 34). The EU, for its part,
kept on stressing that they were not imposing any choice upon Ukraine and accused
Russia of doing so through its restrictive trade measures. Sakwa argues that ‘Russia’s
Greater European initiatives were typically seen in the West as being little more than a
cover for the establishment of a “Greater Russia” by stealth’ (Sakwa, 2014, p. 30).
In summary, endogenous dynamics help to explain how wemoved from cooperation to
competition. This process was driven by an attributional bias, where action of the Other
was increasingly understood in terms of its assumed negative intentions, namely maximis-
ing inﬂuence at the expense of the Self. Their own behaviour, on the other hand, was seen
as the result of environmental constraints: a competitive strategic context for which they
hold the other responsible, not themselves. This is how the logic of competition follows its
own dynamics: reading everything through a prism of competition and rivalry, each nega-
tive action is understood as necessitating a counter reaction. This leads to a negative spiral.
As images grow more negative, they provoke a counter reaction, which in turn only seems
to conﬁrm the negative images held. However, while we faced an accelerating logic of
competition during that decade, inhibiting progress in EU–Russia relations, it did not
spiral out of control. The pragmatic attitude on both sides stopped both sides from
taking extreme action.
These dynamics also help us to situate Russia’s refusal to accept the EU’s normative
hegemony. As noted above, Russia decided at a late stage that it would not join the
ENP, claiming its right to be treated as an equal power. Gradually it started actively chal-
lenging the EU’s hegemony by setting up its own normative counter-hegemony (Hauk-
kala, 2008). Moscow started challenging unipolarity and Eurocentrism and put a strong
emphasis on alternatives, such as multipolarity, sovereignty and non-interference. Refus-
ing to accept the domination of Western views and narrow interpretations, it rejected
the imposition of liberal democracy, the criteria of which are deﬁned by the EU.
Instead it emphasised Russia’s right to choose its own path to democracy and launched
the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’. Moreover, as a driver of the BRICS consultation, it
proﬁled itself as a ‘neo-revisionist’ power, challenging the lack of representativeness of
international structures of governance (Sakwa, 2012, p. 453). Finally, in a neo-traditional
ideology (Sakwa, 2014, p. 75), it embarked on a course where it presented itself as the
true protector of Europe’s ‘traditional’ values – a crystal clear challenge of the EU’s
implicit claim that it can speak for ‘European civilisation’ and thus of its normative
hegemony.
Stage 3: the confrontation over Ukraine – from competition to conﬂict
(2013–present)
The situation on the eve of the Ukraine crisis was thus one where the EU and Russia were
entangled in a logic of competition, the dynamics of which had been formed by an attri-
bution of negative intentions. In a continuous process of action and reaction, mutual
images grew more and more negative and the strategic context was increasingly
deﬁned as competitive. Yet, the competition, up to that point, was somehow contained.
It did not spill over into a direct confrontation.
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This has changed radically with the crisis over Ukraine. Competition between Russia
and the EU is no longer perceived as one over institutional arrangements in the neigh-
bourhood, normative hegemony and identities. This is the point where negative intentions
of direct, coercive control got attributed to the Other. Clearly, this is also the point where
the narratives on the rapid developments of late 2013 and early 2014 radicalised and
diverged more than ever since the end of the Cold War. The developments are in line
with the logic of geopolitical competition, which had developed over the years, but
enters a fundamentally new stage, where competition turns into conﬂict. In short, it
marked the beginning of a third stage in EU–Russia relations.
It is deﬁnitely not the ambition of this section to retrace the sequence of events. Rather
the objective is to demonstrate how existing images of negative intentions were radica-
lised and how this resulted in a new level of power struggle, transcending disagreements
on institutional arrangements in the overlapping neighbourhoods and involving issues of
direct control.
As mentioned above, the Russian view was that the EU was seeking to force Ukraine
into the signing of an Association Agreement in order to reinforce and extend its norma-
tive hegemony and enhance the inﬂuence of the Euro-Atlantic Community in the region.
When the Euromaidan protests erupted, after Ukrainian President Yanukovych refused to
sign the Association Agreement, this was seen by Moscow as ‘staged’ by the West (the
words of Lavrov quoted in Haukkala, 2015, p. 34). The fall of Yanukovych was for Russia
nothing else than a coup. Within the strong zero-sum geopolitical reading of international
relations, that had become dominant in the Kremlin, this was seen as Russia ‘losing’
Ukraine to the West. In a Bzrezinski-like interpretation, this was a dramatic loss, undermin-
ing Russia’s chance to be a great global power and thus affecting its most vital interests
(Bzrezinski, 1997). The West was clearly held responsible for the escalation and was
seen as trying to get direct control over Ukraine and expanding its sphere of inﬂuence,
at the expense of Russia. Moscow reacted with a radical shift in strategy. In a surprise
act, it took control over Crimea, violating both the territorial integrity of Ukraine (of
which it was one of the guarantors in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum) and the European
border regime (according to which borders are inviolable and can only be changed
through negotiated agreements).
Arguably, this radical shift of strategy was driven by Russia’s feeling that it had lost the
competition over institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood. The change of regime
in Kyiv was seen as a defeat in this power struggle. The new government would sign the
Association Agreement and a further move towards the Euro-Atlantic community would
be the result. This triggered a new strategy based on two pillars: active Russian control
and preventing ‘Western’ control. First, fearing the loss of the strategically important
harbour of Sevastopol and the Russian Black Sea ﬂeet, Moscow obtained direct control
over Crimea. Secondly, it tried to prevent the West from getting real control over
Ukraine, with an active policy of destabilisation and polarising Ukraine. Russia’s role in
the conﬂict in Eastern Ukraine should be seen predominantly in this light (Götz, 2015).
Putin summarises the Russian perception as follows in his speech after the annexation
of Crimea:
In short, we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the
18th , 19th and 20th centuries, continues today.… But there is a limit to everything. And with
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Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly
and unprofessionally.… Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from. If you com-
press the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. You must always remember this.
(2014)
From an EU perspective, the annexation of Crimea was seen as a further conﬁrmation of
the bad intentions of Russia.Many regarded this as proof that Russia’s ultimate ambitionwas
to restore control over former Soviet states. The EU and the US imposed sanctions on Russia,
trying to force it to change its course of action. This ‘conﬁrmation’ of Moscow’s bad inten-
tions also provided the perfect opportunity for the EU to regard its own actions as legitimate
and reasonable. In doing so it stubbornly ignored the – not necessarily intended – geopo-
litical impact of its EaP policy. The statement of Pierre Vimont (Executive Secretary-General
of the EEAS) in an inquiry by the House of Lords is quite telling in this respect. He claimed
that the EU ‘never had any clear warning’ from Russia that a DCFTA with Ukraine ‘was unac-
ceptable to them’ (Vimont quoted in House of Lords, 2015, p. 53).
The signiﬁcance of all this is that EU–Russia relationsmoved to a fundamentally new stage
in several respects. First, the power struggle between the EU and Russia was no longer about
institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood, nor about normative hegemony and iden-
tity production. Instead itwas oneofdirect control, forceful anddirect interaction. Second, the
negative images both parties held of each other radicalised at this stage, with intentions seen
as inimical and geopolitically driven. Finally, in terms of Gries’s model, we moved from inter-
group competition to intergroup conﬂict. The confrontationwas not a directmilitary confron-
tation, but therewas considerablemilitary build-up and thewar in Ukraine can be considered
as ‘a proxy conﬂict between the EU and Russia’ (Haukkala, 2015, p. 37).
In relation to this shift from competition to conﬂict, it is important to reiterate Gries’s
point that the development from competition to conﬂict is contingent on many variables,
and in no way automatic. Gries suggests that ‘emotion lies at the juncture between inter-
group competition and conﬂict’ (2005, p. 256). Emotions of anger, humiliation and ven-
geance over injustice may be the central factors determining the shift from competition
to conﬂict. For this to happen, however, agency is essential. Russia’s desire to restore its
great power status and its perception that these ambitions are actively thwarted by the
West have no doubt generated latent feelings of humiliation. However, for humiliation to
become manifest and active, it takes political forces to mobilise people. Undoubtedly this
process preceded the crisis over Ukraine, but it radicalised considerably when the conﬂict
erupted. Humiliation and anti-Westernism gained a much more prominent place in ofﬁcial
discourse (see, for example, Putin’s speech after annexation of Crimea; 2014). The discourse
has also become much more exclusionary, as appears from Putin’s reference to ‘a ﬁfth
column’ in his speech after the annexation of Crimea:
Some Western politicians are already threatening us with not just sanctions but also the pro-
spect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front. I would like to know what it is
they have in mind exactly: action by a ﬁfth column, this disparate bunch of ‘national traitors’,
or are they hoping to put us in a worsening social and economic situation so as to provoke
public discontent? (2014)
This quote exempliﬁes how in the aftermath of the crisis, dissident voices got increasingly




The drastic evolution of EU–Russia relations is a very complex process driven by various
factors. To understand this process, we need to understand not only exogenous factors,
but also the endogenous dynamics of EU–Russia interaction. What drove their relations
in the direction of polarisation? What made things happen when they happened? Could
relations have developed in a different direction, for example, more cooperative relations
between Moscow and Brussels or Russia ﬁrmly anchored in a pan-European structures?
To grasp the dynamics of EU–Russia relations, I relied on insights from social psychol-
ogy. Kowert’s concept of ‘attributional bias’ helped us to understand how Russia and the
EU ended up in dynamics of attributing each other negative intentions and reading each
other’s behaviour in function of the images they had formed, rather than on the basis of
their actual behaviour. The four-stage model of Gries helped us to understand the tran-
sition from cooperation to competition and conﬂict.
Three stages were distinguished in post-Cold War relations between the EU and Russia.
The 1990s roughly represented a stage of cooperation, but characterised by strongly asym-
metrical relations. The dynamics of EU–Russia interaction were characterised by master–
pupil relations. Russia’s choice for a strategy of social mobility – a result of its frank recog-
nition of internal problems – explains why it was prepared to accept an EU-centric agenda.
The transition to a stage of competition – of which the shape became clear between
2004 and late 2013 – occurred because the interaction got increasingly affected by a con-
sequential comparison between Russia and the EU. The dynamics changed into a logic of
competition, where zero-sum, geopolitical thinking gained the upper hand. The behaviour
of the Other was attributed to its intrinsically negative intentions, while the behaviour of
the Self was seen as a legitimate reaction, following from the constraints of a competitive
environment. During this stage, however, competition was constrained by a pragmatic
approach. It was essentially a power struggle over institutional arrangements: competing
integration projects in the overlapping neighbourhoods and normative hegemony.
The conﬂict in Ukraine is the point where the constraints on this logic of competition
disappeared. It is the point where competition transforms into conﬂict. This resulted
from Moscow’s reading of events in Kyiv as a major geostrategic loss for Russia – in line
with the logic of competition. Moscow understood the developments as ‘losing’ Ukraine
to the West and as a humiliating defeat in the struggle over institutional arrangements
in the neighbourhood. It opted for a drastic new coercive and confrontational strategy
of gaining direct control (the annexation of Crimea) and of preventing the West from
gaining real control over Ukraine (by destabilising and dividing the country). While this
transition can only be understood on the basis of an escalating logic of competition, it con-
stitutes a fundamentally new stage of direct conﬂict. The way out will no doubt be long
and winding. It will require a stepwise change of images the EU and Russia hold of
each other, so that trust can slowly be rebuilt.
Notes
1. Agents are an integral part of the endogenous dynamics. From a Social Constructivist perspec-
tive they cannot be seen as bringing in their own ‘exogenous’ interests. Their interests are
imbued with the meaning given through the social process of producing and reproducing
interests.
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2. Kowert (1998) applies attributional bias to the interaction between the UK and Egypt leading
up to the Suez crisis. Gries (2005) applies his model to US–China relations.
3. As major funding programme for the NIS, TACIS ran from 1991 to 2006 and was aimed at pro-
moting democracy, the rule of law and the transition to a market economy.
4. Feklyunina also mentions 2004 as the start of a new Russian PR campaign, seeking to create a
more favourable image, and also increasingly presenting critique from the West as ‘a coordi-
nated campaign’ (Feklyunina, 2008, p. 606).
5. Solana spoke of the ‘EU–Russia Strategic Partnerhsip’ in October 1999 (Solana, 1999). In the
same year, the term was used in the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia (European Council,
1999).
6. In 2015, it was renamed the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and Armenia and Kyrgyzstan
joined the organisation.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Tom Casier is Academic Director of the Brussels School of International Studies, Reader in Inter-
national Relations and Jean Monnet Chair.
References
Allen, D., & Smith, M. (2012, February). The EU, strategic diplomacy and the BRIC countries. Policy paper
11 [Diplomatic System of the EU Network].
Averre, D. (2009). Competing rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ‘Shared Neighbourhood’. Europe-
Asia Studies, 61, 1689–1713.
Browning, C., & Christou, G. (2010). The constitutive power of outsiders: The European
Neighbourhood Policy and the eastern dimension. Political Geography, 29, 109–118.
Bzrezinski, Z. (1997). The Grand Chessboard. American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives.
New York, NY: Basic Books.
Casier, T. (2013). The EU–Russia strategic partnership: Challenging the normative argument. Europe-
Asia Studies, 65, 1377–1395.
Charap, S., & Troitskiy, M. (2013). Russia, the West and the integration dilemma. Survival, 55(6), 49–62.
Clunan, A. (2009). The social construction of Russia’s resurgence. Aspirations, identity and security inter-
ests. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
Commission of the European Communities. (2004). Communication from the commission. European
Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper. Brussels, May 12, COM(2004) 373ﬁnal.
DeBardeleben, J. (2012). Applying constructivism to understanding EU–Russian relations.
International Politics, 49, 418–433.
De Haas, M. (2010). Russia’s foreign security policy in the 21st century. Oxon, MD: Routledge.
Diez, T. (2013). Normative power as hegemony. Cooperation and Conﬂict, 48, 194–210.
European Council. (1999). Common strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia (1999/
414/CFSP). Retrieved September 1, 2010, from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/
november/tradoc_114137.pdf
EU–Russia Joint Statement. (2008). Joint statement of the EU–Russia summit on the launch of nego-
tiations for a new EU–Russia agreement. Khanty-Mansiysk, June 27, 11214/08 (Presse 192).
Retrieved from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/sum06_08/index_en.htm
Feklyunina, V. (2008). Battle for perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West. Europe-Asia Studies, 60,
605–629.
392 T. CASIER
Ferrero-Waldner, Benita. (2005, January 25). Speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European
parliament.
Götz, K. E. (2015). It’s geopolitics, stupid: Explaining Russia’s Ukraine policy. Global Affairs, 1, 3–10.
Gries, P. H. (2005). Social psychology and the identity-conﬂict debate: Is a ‘China threat’ inevitable?
The European Journal of International Relations, 11, 235–265.
Haukkala, H. (2008). The European Union as a regional normative hegemon: The case of European
neighbourhood Policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 60, 1601–1622.
Haukkala, H. (2010). The EU–Russia strategic partnership: The limits of post-sovereignty in international
relations. London: Routledge.
Haukkala, H. (2015). From cooperative to contested Europe? The conﬂict in Ukraine as a culmination
of a long-term crisis in EU–Russia relations. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 23, 25–40.
House of Lords. (2015). European Union committee, 6th Report of Session 2014–2015, The EU and
Russia: Before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine (HL Paper 115). p. 53.
Jepperson, R., Wendt, A., & Katzenstein, P. (1996). The culture of national security: Norms and identity in
world politics. (P. Katzenstein, Ed.). New York, NY: Columbia Press.
Keukeleire, S., & MacNaughtan, J. (2008). The foreign policy of the European Union. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Klinke, I. (2012). Postmoderngeopolitics?TheEuropeanUnioneyesRussia.Europe-AsiaStudies,64, 929–947.
Kontseptsiya. (2000). Kontseptsiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Concept of
national security of the Russian federation]. Utverzhdena ukazom Presidenta Rossiyskoy
Federatsii ot 17 dekabrya 1997g. N° 1300 (v redaktsii Ukaza Presidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot
10 yanvarya 2000g. N° 24).
Kowert, P. (1998). Agent versus structure in the construction of national identity. In V. Kubalkova, N.
Onuf, & P. Kowert (Eds.), International relations in a constructed world (pp. 101–122). New York, NY:
M.E. Sharpe.
Larson, D., & Shevchenko, A. (2014). Russia says no: Power, status and emotions in foreign policy.
Communist and Post-communist Studies, 47, 269–279.
Lavrov, S. (2009, March 21). Lavrov quoted in ‘EU expanding its “sphere of inﬂuence,” Russia says’. EU
Observer. Retrieved August 2011, from http://euobserver.com/24/27827
Light, M., Löwenhardt, J., & White, S. (2000). A wider Europe: The view from Moscow and Kyiv.
International Affairs, 76, 77–88.
Macfarlane, S. N. (2006). The ‘R’ in BRICs: Is Russia an emerging power? International Affairs, 82, 41–57.
Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market
Studies, 40, 235–258.
March, L. (2012). Nationalism for export? The domestic and foreign-policy implications of the new
‘Russian idea’. Europe-Asia Studies, 64, 401–425.
Mearsheimer, J. (2014). Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault: The liberal delusions that provoked
Putin. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), 77–89.
Medium-Term Strategy. (1999). Medium-term strategy for development of relations between the
Russian Federation and the European Union (2000–2010). Unofﬁcial translation. Retrieved
October, from http://presidency.ﬁnland.ﬁ/frame.asp [no longer available]
Morozov, V. (2015). Russia’s postcolonial identity. A subaltern empire in a Eurocentric world. London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Neumann, I. B. (1998). The geopolitics of delineating ‘Russia’ and ‘Europe’: The creation of ‘the Other’
in European and Russian tradition. In T. Casier & K. Malﬂiet (Eds.), Is Russia a European power? The
position of Russia in a New Europe (pp. 17–44). Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. (1997). Agreement on partnership and cooperation
between the European Communities and their member states, of one part, and the Russian
Federation, of the other part. Ofﬁcial Journal, L 327, 3–69.
Pushkov, A. (1993). Letter from Eurasia: Russia and America: The honeymoon’s over. Foreign Policy, 93,
76–95.
Putin, V. (2005, April 25). Annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Retrieved
from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 393
Putin, V. (2011, October 3). ‘Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlya Evrazii – budushchee, kotoroe rozh-
daetcya’. Izvestiya. Retrieved from http://www.izvestia.ru/news/502761
Putin, V. (2014, March 18). Address by President of the Russian Federation.
Reynolds, P. (2008). New Russian world order: The ﬁve principles. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/europe/7591610.stm
Sakwa, R. (2012). The problem of ‘the international’ in Russian identity formation. International
Politics, 49, 449–465.
Sakwa, R. (2014). Frontline Ukraine. Crisis in the borderlands. London: Tauris.
Simão, L. (2011). Discursive differences and policy outcomes: EU–Russia relations and security in
Europe. Eastern Journal of European Studies, 2, 81–95.
Solana, J. (1999, October 13). The EU–Russia Strategic Partnership. Speech by the High Representative
designate of the European Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Stockholm. Retrieved
from http://91.194.202.11/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/59417.pdf
Timmins, G. (2002). Strategic or pragmatic partnership? The European Union’s policy towards Russia
since the end of the Cold War. European Security, 11, 78–95.
Tsygankov, A. (2005). Vladimir Putin’s vision of Russia as a normal great power. Post-Soviet Affairs, 21,
132–158.
Wendt, A. E. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics.
International Organization, 46(2), 391–425.
Wolczuk, K. (2009). Implementation without coordination: The impact of EU conditionality on Ukraine
under the European Neighbourhood Policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(2), 187–211.
Wolczuk, K., & Dragneva, R. (Eds.). (2013). Eurasian economic integration. Law, policy and politics.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
394 T. CASIER
